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  • Strategic Insights: The Assad Regime and Chemical Weapons

    Strategic Insights: The Assad Regime and Chemical Weapons
    2018/05/18
    Dr. Robert J. Bunker On April 7, 2018, insurgents and civilians in a rebel enclave in Douma, east of Damascus, Syria, were subjected to a chemical weapons attack during an offensive conducted by Assad regime and allied Russian and Iranian-linked ground forces. At least 42 individuals were reported to have been killed in the attack due to suffocation—primarily in their homes—with more than 500 additional individuals seeking medical attention.1 Local reports from the encircled enclave suggest that during the late afternoon and evening hours, Assad regime helicopters dropped two barrel bombs containing a substance with signatures consistent with that of chlorine.2 Chlorine—an industrial hazardous material (HAZMAT) chemical with many commercial uses—can also be utilized in chemical warfare as a choking agent. Upon dispersal, this chemical—in its gaseous form—is greenish-yellow in color and heavier than air, which allows it to settle in spots such as basements and other low lying areas, slowly suffocating those to which it comes in contact. The use of chemical warfare agents—and dual-purpose HAZMAT agents such as chlorine with regard to the recent Douma incident—is prohibited under international law. The Syrian Arab Republic, as a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) signatory, is bound under such laws not to engage in chemical warfare attacks, but has repeatedly ignored its legal and moral obligations in accord with that treaty. The timing of this new chemical warfare incident has come at a highly inopportune time for the present U.S. Presidential administration vis-à-vis its recently declared intention to begin to disengage from Syria.3 This incident has resulted in pressure being brought upon the Trump administration to take some form of punitive action against the Assad regime, as took place earlier in response to that regime’s Khan Sheikhoun sarin gas attack on April 4, 2017. All the while, Russian, Iranian, and Hezbollah news outlets and social media have been actively promoting an ongoing propaganda narrative focusing on Western (read liberal democratic) lies and fabrications surrounding the recent Douma incident.4 From the perspective gained from past research on the Assad regime’s relationship to chemical weapons and their domestic use against regime-challenging insurgent forces within Syria, this new incident blatantly appears both premeditated and calculated in the manner in which it was conducted. To gain an appreciation of this strategic insight, a discussion of the Assad regime’s chemical weapons program, earlier chemical weapons use, and the lessons learned from them are provided in this essay. CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM Given the sensitive nature of this subject matter related to the Syrian Arab Republic—it exists within a highly classified state program—its chemical warfare capabilities are opaque at best. The Assad regime—then under Hafez al-Assad— initially acquired chemical weapons, most certainly sulfur mustard (a blister agent) and possibly sarin (a nerve agent), as early as 1972 from Egypt prior to the start of the Yom Kippur War. Russia, during the same period, provided defensive equipment for Syrian military personnel that would be fielding these chemical weapons.5 As a result of the Yom Kippur War defeat, the subsequent defeat in June 1982 in Lebanon by Israel, and ongoing regional security concerns with Iraq, the Assad regime continued to develop its chemical warfare program primarily with Russian support. Sporadic, limited glimpses of, and at times contradictory information related to the Syrian chemical weapons program have since been reported on for more than 4 decades. An overview of this information can be found in the Syrian Chemical Chronology spanning December 1968 through March 2008.6 When more authoritative program information has been provided—such as a declassified Top Secret Central Intelligence Agency intelligence assessment published in November 1985 on this subject (released in November...
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  • Strategic Insights: After the Smoke Clears in Syria: Dilemmas for U.S. Strategy Remain

    Strategic Insights: After the Smoke Clears in Syria: Dilemmas for U.S. Strategy Remain
    2018/05/18
    Dr. Christopher J. Bolan In the wake of recent U.S. and Israeli military strikes, the potential for expanded U.S. military engagement in the Syrian civil war is growing and U.S. policymakers will need to plot a smart strategic course ahead. In doing so, they will need to conduct an honest appraisal of America’s interests in Syria and wrestle with the many strategic dilemmas confronting them. Israel and Iran are clearly testing each other’s limits in Syria raising the prospect of a broader regional confrontation. Iran reportedly sent an armed drone into Israeli airspace in mid-April1 and in early May approved the launching of scores of rockets targeting forward-deployed Israeli forces in the occupied Golan Heights.2 Israel responded with overwhelming military force targeting virtually all known Iranian military facilities in Syria.3 Although it now seems ages ago, it is also worth recalling that the United States, Great Britain, and France conducted direct military action in Syria the early morning of April 14, 2018, by launching over 100 missile strikes destroying 3 facilities associated with Syria’s chemical weapons production and storage capabilities. These attacks were launched in response to Syria’s use of chemical weapons in Douma on April 7th outside the capital of Damascus in which over 40 Syrians were killed. At that time, U.S. President Donald Trump made it clear that the strategic purpose of U.S. missile strikes was to deter the future use of such weapons vowing, “We are prepared to sustain this response until the Syrian regime stops its use of prohibited chemical agents.”4 Secretary of Defense James Mattis made it equally clear that these strikes represented the beginning of neither a broader U.S. military campaign nor a larger shift in U.S. strategy or objectives in Syria. Secretary Mattis specifically noted, “We confined it [the missile strikes] to the chemical weapons-type targets. . . . We were not out to expand this; we were very precise and proportionate.”5 Nonetheless, neither these limited U.S. military strikes nor the tit-for-tat Israeli military exchanges with Iran are likely to significantly impact the basic contours of Syria’s civil war. As the smoke clears from these attacks, U.S. policymakers and actions will continue to be constrained by several grim strategic realities of the conflict in Syria. First, the Syrian crisis will need to be managed within the broader context of many other global security challenges that are of greater consequence to the United States. These include addressing the nuclear threat posed by North Korea, managing the longer-term competition with an increasingly assertive China in Asia, confronting a resurgent Russia in Eastern Europe, and preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability. American military engagement in Syria has been primarily motivated by one central concern: the immediate terrorist threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). At its peak in early 2015, ISIS dominated a taxable population of some 11 million people spread over 100,000 square kilometers, which is slightly larger than the territory of South Korea.6 That threat, however, has been significantly degraded through an aggressive U.S. coalition air campaign backed on the ground by a combination of Syrian Kurdish militia and Arab partners. The so-called ISIS “Caliphate” is now in tatters with its territorial holdings reduced by more than 98 percent according to Pentagon estimates.7 With ISIS a much-diminished threat, Syria will only temporarily and periodically resurface to compete for the attention of U.S. policymakers and the expenditures of U.S. resources. Furthermore, President Trump’s basic instinct in Syria remains to declare victory over ISIS and withdraw U.S. forces as soon as practical. In early April, the President openly declared his intent to bring U.S. troops back home within months: “I want to get out, I want to bring the troops back home,
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  • Strategic Insights: Proxy War Norms

    Strategic Insights: Proxy War Norms
    2017/12/18
    Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff Current trends in international relations suggest the United States will place a greater reliance on international partners in securing vital national interests. Growing assertiveness by regional state actors, increasingly capable nonstate actors, and a “war-weary” American public suggest the emergence of a “polyarchic” world order that will strain the United States’ ability to maintain sufficient forces overseas, where it currently exchanges defense commitments for access and basing.1 Rather, the United States may have to commit to a strategy broadly described as “off-shore balancing” that would rely on regional partners to uphold the balance of power in their own neighborhood, exchanging indirect U.S. support for the partner’s willingness to act in the interests of the United States.2 Even if it does not commit to such a strategy, current events suggest working through others to achieve strategic ends will be a feature in any future approach to international relations. Such a strategy will not only encourage proxy relationships, but as these state and nonstate challenges arise, they encourage proxy wars as well. In fact, there are a number of proxy wars underway in places like Yemen, where the United States supports Saudi Arabia’s efforts to contain Iranian influence; Syria, where the United States, Iran, and Russia support different factions to achieve a variety of foreign policy goals; Iraq, where the Government of Iraq relies on militias to confront the Islamic State on its behalf; and Ukraine, where Russia backs a separatist movement ostensibly to protect Russian citizens, but more likely to keep Kiev off balance and prevent Ukraine’s drift toward the West. Surprisingly, there is little written on the norms of proxy wars. While there is some international law that governs state sponsorship of foreign nonstate actors,3 the default position is if the proxy war is just, then so is the proxy relationship. However, entering into such relationships creates massive opportunities for moral failure. These opportunities arise because the introduction of the benefactor complicates already complex and somewhat subjective decisions made with regard to resorting to war and introduces a corrupting influence that risks distorting the reasons that drive those decisions. Because benefactors bring these moral complications, they bear the greater burden to address them. This point does not entail proxies have no responsibilities. What it does entail is that most moral decisions regarding proxy wars are often in the hands of the benefactor, without whom there would be no proxy relationship to judge. Since proxy wars are wars, moral analysis should start with the traditional provisions of jus ad bellum, but also reflect the potentially corrupting influence a benefactor brings. In what follows, I will first discuss how the character of proxy war impacts its ethics, and then I describe that impact through the application of jus ad bellum conditions, as well as examine the kinds of moral hazards proxy wars give rise to even when those jus ad bellum conditions are met. THE CHARACTER OF PROXY WAR Andrew Mumford defines proxy war as “indirect engagement in a conflict by third parties wishing to influence its strategic outcome.”4 It is the indirect nature of the benefactor’s involvement that distinguishes a proxy relationship from other supportive relationships, such as, for example, an alliance.5 This point does not suggest that direct action by the benefactor is incompatible with proxy relationships. In Libya, for example, the international coalition provided support to rebel forces while at the same time directly attacked Gaddafi’s forces from the air. So, while air strikes did contribute to Gaddafi’s defeat, the coalition limited its risk—as well as its costs—by supporting proxies on the ground that acted as a surrogate for ground forces it would have otherwise had to commit.
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  • Strategic Insights: Thinking Strategically About Latin America and the Caribbean

    Strategic Insights: Thinking Strategically About Latin America and the Caribbean
    2016/12/09
    Dr. R. Evan Ellis In the 2016 U.S. presidential debates, as on other occasions, the theme of Latin America and the Caribbean was remarkably absent. Important events in the region occasionally insert themselves into the U.S. consciousness through the mainstream media, including: the arrival of thousands of Central American child refugees at the U.S. border; the U.S. re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba; the impending collapse of Venezuela; and the Colombian public’s rejection, on October 2, 2016, of the agreement between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Yet even with its geographic connectedness to the United States, and although Latin America eclipses even China and Asia as the U.S. principal foreign trading partner, and despite the fact that more U.S. residents have family in the region than any other part of the world, Latin America, and the Caribbean continue to be remarkably absent from the U.S. strategic and foreign policy discourse.1 Part of the job of the U.S. Army War College is to educate future military leaders and prepare them for higher command, including thinking about the global strategic environment within which U.S. forces operate and how that environment is evolving. A range of security-related issues compete for the attention of U.S. leaders, from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and instability in the Middle East, to the nuclear and ballistic missile threat from North Korea, to Russian belligerence toward the West in the Ukraine and elsewhere, to a recalcitrant Iran now re-connected with global financial and commercial markets, to the ever greater presence of the People’s Republic of China in world trade and its increasing willingness to assert its interests, to non-traditional threats, including the Zika virus and other emergent diseases, cyberthreats, potentially disruptive new technologies, and even the emergence of space as a theater in which multiple U.S. rivals now operate. To be frank, the space that Latin America occupies in the agenda of senior U.S. military leaders is limited at best. Within the U.S. Army, there are talented people who serve in Latin America-focused assignments in the Pentagon, U.S. Army South, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. Special Operations Command 7th Group, National Guard State Partner Programs (SPPs), and within the individual security cooperation offices (SCOs) of the U.S. embassies in Latin America, among others. However, the number of Latin America-focused U.S. Army personnel is small compared to the number of personnel focused on other areas, such as the Middle East, Asia, Africa, Europe, and, of course, the U.S. homeland. The Strategic Importance of the Region.      Let's be clear. Although it is possible to postulate scenarios in which terrorists, rogue governments, or foreign powers pose a threat to the United States from Latin America and the Caribbean, by comparison to the rest of the world, the region is at peace and arguably does not present the same near-term existential threats to the United States as those found in other regions. Yet, therein lies the misunderstanding. The absence of a near-term existential threat from Latin America and the Caribbean does not make it any less strategically important for the United States. Its strategic importance stems from its unique and inherent potential as both a vulnerability and as an opportunity to support the effectiveness of U.S. engagement in the globally interconnected world. As noted previously, there is arguably no region (including Asia) upon which the United States is more dependent for its prosperity and security, and with which it is more closely tied through bonds of family, than Latin America and the Caribbean. In terms of trade and investment, from manufacturers to the food Americans put on the table, there is no region for which disruption of commerce with the United States could do more damage to our economy and the everyday lives of ...
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  • Strategic Insights: Letting the Millennials Drive

    Strategic Insights: Letting the Millennials Drive
    2016/05/02
    Dr. Leonard Wong In the preface to the Army’s Operating Concept, General David Perkins, Commanding General of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, counsels that as the Army prepares for the future, “We must not be consumed with focusing solely on avoiding risk, but build[ing] leaders and institutions that recognize and leverage opportunities.”1 Indeed, the complex world in which the future force will operate demands that the junior leaders of today—the Millennials—be developed into tomorrow’s future leaders capable of exercising aggressive, independent, and disciplined initiative.  Today’s Millennials, however, are coming out of an American society that has become increasingly uneasy about potential danger and progressively intolerant to risk. For example, in days gone by, a driver’s license was a traditional rite of passage in the journey to becoming an adult.  It was a tangible symbol of freedom and independence that gave teens the ability to get themselves to a part-time job, get home from sports practices, or just cruise around on Friday nights.  Even if the likelihood of buying their own car was near zero and the family car was mostly off limits, teens still worked diligently through the process of getting a license regardless. Not so today.  There has been an incredible shift in this country in the percentage of young people obtaining their driver’s licenses.  For example, in 1983, 46.2% of all 16-year-olds had a driver’s license.  In 2008, the percentage had dropped to 31.1%.  By 2014, astonishingly only 24.5% of 16-year-olds had a license2—that’s a 20% drop in the last three decades.  Similarly, the percentage of American high school seniors who reported having a driver's license declined from 85% in 1996 to an unbelievable 73% in 2010.3 Of course, some explain this trend by pointing out that Millennials these days have less incentive to travel because they are constantly tethered to their smartphones and can easily stay in touch with peers through social media. However, past generations of teens were also glued to screens (but on TVs) and also had phones (albeit antiquated landlines), but that didn’t stop them from getting their licenses as soon as possible.  Others point to the growth of graduated licensing programs that require more driving experience before teens can obtain full driving privileges.  True, but even these programs and their added conditions do not prohibit young people from getting their licenses at age 16.  Finally, some will blame the economy and the cost of insurance as insurmountable obstacles in the pursuit of a license.  While the economy is certainly a factor, analysis of another youth transportation trend suggests that perhaps a more subtle shift in parental attitudes is at play. A recent national survey conducted by YouGov, a global research company, found that 8% of Americans do not know how to ride a bicycle. While just 5% of those 55 and older lack that skill, a surprising 13% of those 18 to 34 do not know how to ride.4  Why is learning how to ride a bike—a key initiation rite for nearly all children—becoming a less universal experience for the Millennial generation?  Laying the blame for this trend on increased technology or tightened budgets in a tough economy is not so easy.  Our society’s approach toward developing young people has fundamentally changed.  It appears that fewer of today’s youth are learning how to ride a bike—or how to drive a car—because of two underlying reasons. First, as a society, we are becoming increasingly risk averse.  The thought of an impetuous child guiding a two-wheeler unsteadily around the block (even wearing a helmet) or a headstrong adolescent sitting behind the wheel of the family car (with tunes blaring) brings to mind the possibility of ill-advised decisions, potential kidnappings, avoidable crashes, and inevitable heartache.  Never mind that improved vehicle designs and safety technology have brought auto fatality risks to record ...
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  • Strategic Insights: The Coming Perfect Storm of Europe

    Strategic Insights: The Coming Perfect Storm of Europe
    2016/04/15
    Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. Adelberg A collection of social and security trends are at play in Europe that may threaten the peace and stability of the continent. The array of challenges, threats, and frictions could converge at such a point that an unintentional spark could ignite a major crisis or even a regional war of some type. The most obvious security threat to Europe is Russia and its evident willingness to employ force, including proxy forces, like it did to reshape national borders in Ukraine. Russia does not, of course, view this operation as expeditionary expansionism, but rather as a necessity to stabilize a crisis on its border. Russia sees the Ukraine annexation as not of its own making, but rather like that of a tornado that drew in Russia against its desires.1 This narrative conveniently overlooks the fact that Russian economic warfare, to prevent Ukraine from entering into an Association Agreement with the EU, was the catalyst for the eventual Euromaidan protests and subsequent violence. Russia’s basic national security strategy is to keep its "neighboring belt stable," NATO weak, China close, and the United States focused elsewhere.2 A weak NATO is hardly anything new, but it is the stable neighboring belt goal that is the most challenging to Europe, since stability is in the eye of the beholder. Ukraine was stable, right up to the point when Russian actions led to the Euromaidan crisis and started a war. It should come as no surprise to Russia observers that the Ukraine crisis illustrates that Russia sees stability in its neighboring belt as being loyal to Russia. Following this line of reasoning, the Baltic States, as NATO members, might be at risk of being viewed by Moscow as an unstable region. It is by no means a certainty, or even a high probability, that Russia will conduct a Ukraine-style hybrid operation to destabilize and seize any or all of the Baltics. However, there is enough of a possibility that NATO cannot ignore the risk; otherwise, the very legitimacy of NATO itself would be threatened should Russia act and NATO be unprepared and unable to protect an alliance state. Additionally, since budgets and military forces are finite resources, then every euro spent toward strengthening NATO’s Russian flank against the possibility of Russian aggression is one less euro spent elsewhere; for example, toward counter-terrorism, refugee and immigrant programs, and domestic law enforcement among others. This is not necessarily an argument against spending for enhanced NATO defense against Russian aggression, it is simply a fact that causes friction. However, among the general European Union (EU) population, terrorism is viewed as the one of greatest threats to European security, and Russian aggression is not even mentioned.3 Obviously there is very good reason for Europeans to be concerned with terrorism. Besides the Charlie Hebdo/Jewish Market attacks and the Bataclan Theater and associated attacks in Paris in 2015, London witnessed a gruesome public beheading of a soldier in May 2013 and a foiled ISIS-motivated stabbing in a subway station in December 2015. There was also the thwarted Paris train attack in August 2015, foiled by three American passengers. In February, 2015, two victims died in a terrorist shooting in Copenhagen. Overall, Europol reports that the EU regularly experiences a triple-digit number of terror attacks each year (2009 – 316; 2010 – 249; 2011 – 174; 2012 – 219; 2013 – 152; 2014 – 199),4 and there are no indications this trend will change. In addition to terrorism, immigration is a major concern of the general population. In March 2015, 19% of EU citizens identified immigration as one of the greatest threats to European security.5 In November 2015 the response were drastically different, 58% identified immigration as the most important issue facing the EU.6 1,046,599 migrants and refugees reportedly arrived in Europe in 2015, and nearly 150,000 have already arrived in 2016.
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  • Strategic Insights: Mexico—New Directions, Continuity, and Obstacles in the Fight Against Transnational Organized Crime

    Strategic Insights: Mexico—New Directions, Continuity, and Obstacles in the Fight Against Transnational Organized Crime
    2016/03/31
    Dr. R. Evan Ellis From February 15-23, 2016, I1 had the opportunity to travel to Mexico to conduct interviews with Mexican security experts about the evolution of transnational organized crime in the country and the work of Mexico's current government to combat it. My trip to Mexico coincided with the February 12-17 visit to Mexico by Pope Francis. The Pope also focused on issues related to organized crime during stops in Michoacán2 and Ciudad Juarez.3 This focus briefly highlighted to the world the gravity of Mexico’s struggle, and the importance of prevailing for the future of the country and the region. While I did not have the good fortune to see Pope Francis, the following are some of my preliminary insights regarding Mexico’s struggle against organized crime, based on my interviews and supporting research. In comparing the perspectives of Mexican government officials, the Armed Forces and police to those of academics, journalists, teachers and taxi drivers, the range of perceptions regarding what is happening in the country is stunning. At the popular level, cynicism is profound regarding President Enrique Peña Nieto and his government, the principal political parties, and security and justice institutions at the national, state, and local levels. In the tradition of surreal drama reflected in Mexico’s television art form, the telenovela, allegations abound of criminal connections involving President Peña Nieto, senior government, Army, and intelligence figures, and even the media outlet Televisa, and senior Mexican Clergy. Without attempting to evaluate the veracity of such allegations, it is clear that Mexico’s struggle against transnational organized crime is compounded by a profound crisis of public confidence. Nonetheless, beyond such cynicism, the Peña Nieto government has made important changes in both style and substance in combating criminal cartels, gangs, and related internal security challenges in Mexico. In the “National Development Plan” for the current sexenio, President Peña Nieto and his government have emphasized a “multidimensional” approach toward security, giving attention in the document to the integration of security and developmental goals and societal health.4 With the return of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) to the Presidency following a 12-year hiatus, Peña Nieto has sought to more actively involve state-level governments in the security decision-making process, given that the majority of states in Mexico have historically been, and continue to be, governed by the PRI. Peña Nieto has expanded the outreach to states not only through the influential council of governors (CONAGO),5 but also through the broadly inclusive, albeit unwieldy, “National Council on Public Security.” This council meets twice per year, as well as in special sessions such as that called by Peña Nieto upon his inauguration. It includes Mexico’s governors and their security officials, a representation of mayors and non-governmental organizations, the heads of both houses of the Mexican Congress, both of the nation’s separate Armed Forces, and a variety of other federal organizations. Beyond holding such coordinating meetings, the president has also targeted five impoverished “special economic zones,” principally in the south of the country, to receive a special combination of security and development assistance, such as infrastructure projects. However, these projects are either in their infancy or still to be defined, and correspondingly, the fruits of such efforts have yet to emerge. The Peña Nieto government has also increased efforts to integrate the activities of the Mexican Army, Navy, and law enforcement institutions in combatting organized crime. Symbolically, under Peña Nieto, the government is using a single press spokesman to announce the results of all operations, rather than separate spokespersons from the Army, Navy and other organizations, as was the case previously.
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  • Colloquium Brief: Robotics and Military Operations – Kingston Conference on International Security

    Colloquium Brief: Robotics and Military Operations – Kingston Conference on International Security
    2015/08/14
    Dr. Robert J. Bunker   Key Insights: A number of definitions for autonomous systems exist. One of the working definitions used at the colloquium was that in which their key feature is viewed as the ability of a given system to perform certain functions independently. Autonomous systems can support military operations by contributing to force protection as well as increasing mobility and improving lethality. The level of autonomy varies across platforms, but human oversight is still viewed as central to the deployment of autonomous systems in military operations. The definition of the term “robot,” on the other hand, is generally more agreed upon. It signifies a technology that requires sensors, artificial intelligence, and tools to carry out its tasks. However, much debate still exists concerning human decisionmaking requirements—vis-à-vis in the loop, on the loop, or outside the loop—with regard to armed robotic systems. This debate is framed by increasing the observe, orient, decide and act (OODA) loop requirements in warfare that surpass human cognition capacity (military necessity) weighed against the traditional view that only human beings should be responsible for the decision to take the lives of other human beings (ethics and morality). Limitations on autonomous robots are derived from mechanical (effectors), environment (hazards), and mission (objectives) variables. Simple robot use scenarios are far more favorable to autonomous systems because the complexity threshold is lower. Therefore, a sense-model-plan-act (SMPA) model is utilized to contend with the robotics complexity problem. This model is based on SMPA iterations and draws upon deliberate and reactive acts. This is why open air and open sea type environments are much easier at present to operate autonomous systems in than complex and populated urban environments. Emerging technologies that may overcome these limitations are based on probabilistic, networking, and parallel processing innovations. Our adversaries—nonstate and even potentially state based—will not be constrained by our democratic legal and ethical inhibitors in using these systems. Many of these will be enemies of all civilized peoples. For some years now, groups such as Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, Islamic State, and others have been utilizing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for terrorist plots, anti-personnel targeting, reconnaissance, and even propaganda purposes. As a result, we need to not only red team current and near future opposing force capabilities (to about 10 years out) but to develop countermeasures to opposing remote controlled and semi- and fully-autonomous systems (e.g., countercyber control targeting) and operating concepts (e.g. counterswarm).  Continuity and change issues must also be considered when looking at these systems. Robotics and autonomous systems (RAS) will not be revolutionary in the sense that they will change the fundamental nature of war. Four constants in war exist; war is an extension of politics, it is profoundly human (fear, honor, and interest), it is characterized by uncertainty (complexity, interaction with enemies, and new technologies), and it is inherently a contest of wills. Still, change from an evolutionary perspective will be profound, similar to that of the revolution in military affairs (RMA). From the context of land warfare—that is, from a human muddy boots on the ground perspective—this change will be less significant, however, than it will be in naval, air, and space mediums. Robotics and autonomous systems technologies quite likely exist within the context of much greater revolutionary potentials intertwined with nonlethal targeting, new energy sources, advanced manufacturing (3-D and 4-D printing), networked and cloud based information and social media, the commercialization of security, and changing human values. U.S.
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